I. INTRODUCTION
Files typically follow naming conventions that use standard extensions describing its type or the applications used to open and process the file. However, although a file may be named Paper.doc', it may not be a legitimate Word document file unless it is successfully opened and displayed by Microsoft Word, or parsed and checked by tools, such as the Unixfile command, if such tools exist for the file type in question.
The Unix file command performs several syntactic checks of a file to determine whether it is text or binary executable, otherwise it is deemed data, a "catch all" for just about anything. These tests include checking of header information, for example, for "magic numbers", to identify how the file was created. One test performed by file considers whether the bulk of byte values are printable ASCII characters, and hence such files are deemed text files.
The magic numbers serve as a "signature" to identify the file type, such as in the case of .PDF files where the header contains "25 50 44 46 2D 3 1 2E". However, a pure signature-based (or string compare) file type analyzer [ [3, 41. In the case of network traffic analysis, due to different packet fragmentation, the beginning portion of a fiIe may not be entirely contained in a single packet datagram or it may be purposely padded and intermixed with other data in the same packet to avoid signature-based detection. Finally, not all file types have a distinct "magic number".
In this paper we propose a method to analyze the contents of exemplar files using efficient statistical modeling techniques. In particular, we apply n-gram analysis to the binary content of a set of exemplar "training" files and produce normalized n-gram distributions representing all files of a specific type. Our aim is to determine the validity of files claiming to be of a certain type (even though the header may indicate a certain file type, the actual content may not be what is claimed) or to determine the type of an unnamed file object. In our prior work, we exploited this modeling technique in network packet content analysis for zero-day worm detection [ 5 ] .
We extend that work here for checking file types, whether in network traffic flows or on disk. In our prior work we generate many models conditioned on porthervice and length of payload. This generates a set of models that very accurately represent normal data flow and identifies different data quite accurately.
McDaniel and Heydari 161 introduced algorithms for generating "fingerprints" of file types using byte-value distributions of file content that is very similar in spirit to the work reported here. There are, however, several important differences in our work. First, they compute a single representative fingerprint for the entire class of file types. Our work demonstrates that it is very difficulty to produce one single descriptive model that accurately reporesents all members of a single file type class. Their reported experimental results also demonstrate this. Hence, we introduce the idea of computinp a set of centroid models and use clustering to find a minimal set of centroids with good performance. Furthermore, the McDaniel paper describes tests using 120 files divided among 30 types, with 4 files used to compute a model for each type. We have discovered that files within the same type may vary greatly (especially documents with embedded objects such as images), and hence so few a number of exemplars may achieve poor performance. In section I1 we briefly describe n-gram analysis and an overview of the modeling techniques used in this study, Section 111 details the data sets and the detailed experimental results. Section I V concludes the paper.
FILEPRINTS

A. n-gram Analysis
Before demonstrating and graphically plotting the fileprints of the file contents, we first introduce n-gram
analysis. An n-gram [9] is a subsequence of N consecutive tokens in a stream of tokens. n-gram analysis has been applied in many tasks, and is well understood and efficient to implement.
By converting a string of data to n-grams, it can be embedded in a vector space to efficiently compare two or more streams of data. Alternatively, we may compare the distributions of n-grams contained in a set of data to determine how consistent some new data may be with the set of data io question.
An n-gram distribution is computed by sliding a fixedsize window through the set of data and counting the number of occurrences of each "gram". Figure 2 displays an example of a 3-byte window sliding right one byte at a time to generate each 3-gram. Each 3-gram is displayed in the highlighted "window". should be checked against the MS Word fileprint. In order to compute such models, we use the existing store of the client for training data to compute the fileprints. We follow this strategy in the experiments performed and described in the following sections. However, €or some file types, we searched the intemet using Google to prepare a set of "randomly chosen" representatives of a file type, to avoid any bias a single client machine may produce, and to provide the opportunity for other researchers to validate our results by accessing the same files that are also available to them.
C. Modeling and Testing Technique
In this section, we describe several strategies to improve the efficiency and accuracy of the technique: truncation, reducing the amount of data modeled in each file, and multiple-centroids computed via clustering, a finergrained modeling of each file type.
Truncation
Truncation simply means we model only a fixed portion of a file when computing a byte distribution. That portion may be a fixed prefix, say the first 1000 bytes, or a fixed portion of the tail of a file, as well as perhaps a middle portion. This has several advantages:
-For most files, it can be assumed that the most present the results of experiments on both truncated and non-truncated files to test this conjecture.
Centroids
There are good reasons why some file types have similar distributions. Figure 4 compares MS Office formats (Word, Powerpoint, and Excel). The formats are similar, and the technique presented in this paper would certainly not be sufficient to distinguish the different sub-types from one another. However, it may be the case that any one of the models, or all of them at once, can be used to distinguish any MS Office document from, say, a virus. On the other hand, files with the same extension do not always have a distribution similar enough to be represented by a single model. For example, .EXE files might be totally different when created for different purposes, such as system files, games, or media handlers. Another example is documentation files that may contain a variety of mixed media. Thus, an alternative strategy for representing files of a particular type is to compute "multiple models". We do this via a clustering strategy. Rather than computing a single model MA for files of type A, we compute a set of models M", , k>Z. The multiple model strategy requires a different test methodology, however. During testing, a test file is measured against all centroids to determine if it matches at least one of the centroids. The collection of such centroids is considered a fileprint for the entire class. The multiple model technique creates more accurate models, and separates foreign files from the normal files of a particular type in more precise manner.
In the experiments reported here, the multiple models are computed by the K-Meum algorithm under Manhattan The K-means algorithm that computes multiple centroids is briefly described as follows.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Randomly pick K files from the training data set. These K files (their byte value frequency distribution) are the initial seeds for the first K centroids representing a cluster.
For each remaining file in the training set, compute the Manhattan Distance against the K selected centroids, and assign that file to the closest seed centroid.
Update the centroid byte value distribution with the distribution of the assigned file.
Repeat step 2 and 3 for all remaining files, until the centroids stabilize without any further substantive change.
The result is a set of K centroid models, &A which are later used in testing unknown files.
FILE TYPE CLASSIFICATION AND ANOMALY DETECTION:
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS .PDF files were collected from Google by using the search term ".pdf". In this way, the files can be considered randomly chosen as an unbiased sample. (The reader can also repeat our experiments since the same files may be available through the same simple search.)
In
In our earlier experiment, we found that EXE and DLL have essentially the exact same header information and extremely similar 1 -gram distributions. They are used for similar purposes in an MS system. We consider that they are in the same class in this paper. The contents of MS Office file types are also similar (see Figure 4) . They have 
Exemplar files used as centroids
We may extend the multi-centroids method without using K-means. In this experiment we test each file against the distributions of a randomly chosen set of exemplar files.
The same technique was used as described in the previous tests, but here we randomly choose 80% of the files as the 
Iv. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we demonstrate the 1-gram binary distribution of files for different file types. The experiments demonstrate that every file type has a distinctive distribution that we regard as a 'tfileprint". This observation is important. The centroid models representing the byte value distributions of a set of training files can be an effective tool in a number of applications including the detection of security policy violations. Techniques that may be used by attackers to hide their malware from signature-based systems will have a tougher time being stealthy to avoid detection using these techniques.
Moreover, we found that the truncated modeling technique performs as well if not better than modeling whole files, with superior computational performance.
This implies real-time network-based detectors that accurately identify the type of files flowing over a network are achievable at reasonable cost.
